For our first ever episode talking about Amazon (somehow?), Logic Magazine co-founder Moira Weigel tells us what she learned about Amazon by spending years interviewing its third-party sellers. From hand sanitizer hoarding to Chinese vendors getting “dragon boated,” Moira gives us a fascinating look at a massive, unregulated economy.
Moira Weigel is assistant professor in the Department of Communication Studies at Northeastern University and co-founder of Logic Magazine along with friend of the podcast Ben Tarnoff. The two of them recently published the book Voices from the Valley, and her writing can be found in the New York Times, ProPublica, and The New Republic.
Transcript
Ethan Zuckerman:
Hey everybody, welcome back to Reimagining the Internet. I’m Ethan Zuckerman. I am here today in a quite lovely basement of the W.E.B. Du Bois Library at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, and I am sitting across a table with Moira Weigel. Moira is assistant professor in the Department of Communication Studies at Northeastern University. She is a founder of Logic Magazine, along with Ben Tarnoff. She and Ben recently wrote a book called Voices from the Valley, tech workers talk about what they do and how they do it. Moira writes a ton. She’s written for the Guardian, New York Times, the New Republic. And recently she has written a set of pieces that are just fire about Amazon and the implications of its various different business models. Moira, it’s so good to have you here.
Moira Weigel:
Thank you so much for having me.
Ethan Zuckerman:
So help us understand what Amazon actually is. you write a lot about Amazon in terms of third party sellers. Who are these third parties? Who are the three parties in general? Why is this something we should be paying attention to?
Moira Weigel:
Thanks. So let me see. I love that you phrase this question as what is Amazon? Because I actually, you know, while doing this research and I’m still working on different aspects of this research would often get into a kind of cosmic mood trying to think about how would I define to an alien anthropologist what Amazon is. But part of why I got into this particular research subject or took this angle of approach is because even though curiously I think it hadn’t, at least when I started it hadn’t been as studied as one might expect, Amazon is at its heart a retail business. I think my background was in thinking, or before this I’d been thinking about right wing media and issues, I actually don’t like the concept of disinformation, but issues under the umbrella of sort of mis- and disinformation. I got interested in Amazon by looking at sort of how certain media actors were using itself publishing platform, but then through that came to be fascinated by Amazon on its own terms.
And I think, you know, from the beginning, of course Amazon starts as a retail business. It always wants to say it’s a technology firm, not a retail firm. But I got into these third-party sellers because they’re really key actors in driving the retail business, and they have been for decades at this point. If you buy something through Amazon.com in the United States, there’s over a 60% chance that you’re buying from a third party. The fees they pay are one of Amazon’s highest revenue sources and have been for years. And so in a sense, they’re these hidden intermediaries that have driven the growth of one of the most powerful corporations in the world. As I got interested in Amazon as a company and a platform, I started to think that these third parties navigating it actually were like a way to get at how it works, get into how it works.
Ethan Zuckerman:
I think when most of us think about Amazon, we think of giant warehouses filled with bins of every conceivable product and poorly paid non-union workers walking around filling Amazon boxes with product and shipping them out. But that’s not the case at least 60% of the time. I will share with you my most recent Amazon purchase. I’m trying to up my weightlifting. I’m looking for a 500 pound deadlift at age 50. Wow. I just bought a bunch of Olympic weight plates from Amazon. But I almost certainly didn’t buy them from Amazon. Who did I buy them from? How did they get to me? And why does that matter?
Moira Weigel:
Yeah. So first of all, I’m very impressed that you’re lifting 500 pounds.
Ethan Zuckerman:
No, no, no. I aspire to lifting 500 pounds.
Moira Weigel:
I ordered just like the stretchy band. So I’m on a different end of the spectrum. So any weight near that sounds very impressive. Yeah, so 60% of what’s bought, let’s say on Amazon.com, is bought through Amazon rather than from Amazon. What I mean by that is that it’s bought from third parties and that means from small and medium-sized businesses that use Amazon as a platform to sell their goods. And what exactly that means can vary by circumstances. But in most cases, it means that a company uses Amazon to list their products, pays Amazon to advertise and warehouse and deliver in most cases their products.
So they may actually be in the huge non-union warehouse as well. In fact, they probably are. And uses Amazon to reach customers. So third party and also just in legal terms, the reason these sellers are called third party sellers is because in legalese, you know, the first party to a transaction sells it to the second party, but the third party, how to put this? I mean, it’s funny because in a way, really, Amazon’s the third party. But in theory, even though these goods are usually sourced and advertised and everything according to Amazon’s imperatives and logics, even though they’re stored in Amazon’s warehouses and delivered to their logistic systems, in theory, they never belong to Amazon. just acting as a platform or intermediary.
And I was sort of fascinated. I hadn’t researched retail much before. But as I dug into this and realized that Amazon is really like an eBay grafted into a Walmart in a way that’s often hard for consumers to see actually based on the interface, the third parties are the ones who do that or make it that way and do the work and bear the risk of sourcing all these goods. But let’s sort of explore that in practical terms.
Ethan Zuckerman:
If I went to my local Dick’s Sporting Goods and tried to buy these same weight plates, that would be inventory that Dick’s owned in their store. And I would buy it from Dick’s. They would be the first party, I would be the second party. If I went to DicksSportingGoods.com, there’s a decent chance that I’m still transacting with Dick’s sporting goods with them as the first party in the second party, I know that Dick’s Sporting Goods doesn’t manufacture weights, they’re being manufactured by someone in China.
Why is that so different? What is it that Amazon has done differently? And what’s the sort of legal and organizational benefit that it gets from treating these third party sellers differently?
Moira Weigel:
So it’s a great question. I don’t want to hedge on it, but in a funny way, it isn’t, it isn’t so different, right? Because we know that large retailers like Walmart since the 1980s and 1990s have increasingly integrated their data systems with those of their suppliers and pushed, designed all kinds of exploitative contracts with suppliers that effectively, because they delay payment, push risk, either down or up the supply chain closer to the China end, where things are getting manufactured.
But Amazon introduced that was new in the early 2000s, and then particularly starting with this new fulfillment system. I’d be happy to talk about around 2010, was that they made it possible for anyone with an IP address and $40-ish a month to sign up for one of these seller accounts through their platform.
A thing that Amazon did that I think was quite ingenious in its way was they had a policy from the beginning that they called a single listing policy. So when I search for some weights of a particular kind on Amazon, typically it’ll turn up one page of that kind of weights and perhaps there are 10 sellers competing to sell those weights at the lowest price, sort of behind the screen. If I were to go on eBay, I think I’d get 10 entries for 10 different of the same weight. There are a lot of implications to this. I think in the end consumers did prefer the Amazon model for most things to the eBay model and it also gives Amazon all kinds of control over how the marketplace works that eBay didn’t have. In effect, what this does is that sort of in the way that Uber and all these exploitative gig work platforms have offloaded risks and responsibilities associated with traditional employment onto independent contractors.
This basically applies, what Amazon did, applies this risk shift logic to retail, right? So whereas Dick’s, I actually don’t know almost anything about Dick’s Sporting Goods specifically, but I assume when Dick’s sporting goods acquires those weights, they have to go buy those weights from a supplier, they put them in their store. If one of those weights turns out to be defective and falls on you or something afterwards, they’d potentially be liable for any harm to a customer that might result from defective weights.
Amazon has created a contract form, like a technological and contract form where the third party sellers bear, do all the work of finding the goods, bear all the cost associated with acquiring them, and then pay Amazon to store them and advertise them and so on. And so it’s, in a sense, I do think it applies this similar risk shift logic to another industry. In a way, again, that’s not entirely novel.
I think I often want to stress that, again, it’s like Walmart had done many, in practice, had found many ways to stiff clothing manufacturers with the bill and so on, earlier on, but it’s sort of accelerates and extends that process.
Ethan Zuckerman:
So Walmart is amazingly good at stiffing its suppliers, but generally speaking, if something breaks, you bring it back to Walmart and you’ll probably get your money back. That’s not the case with Amazon, although you say it’s very complicated. So you’ve got a great piece in the New York Times last year called “What You Don’t Know About Amazon.” It starts with the story of Kerry Gartner, who orders a TV remote from Amazon in 2017 At some point the remote breaks, the cover pops off, a lithium battery is exposed, his 19-month-old daughter swallows the lithium battery and permanently damages her esophagus. This seems like a classic product liability suit. You should sue Amazon. And Amazon says, “Wait a second, we didn’t do business with you. How does that work and what comes out of that arrangement?”
Moira Weigel:
Yeah, it’s an interesting case. And actually, this is one area, and I should say I’m not a lawyer, but I did learn more about tort law to write that New York Times piece than I ever thought I would. It’s a question that’s being litigated in different states and has a different status and slightly different states in the U.S. But in that particular case, which is in the state of Texas and in general, Amazon has made a version of the platform defense, right? Like they’re just a platform. And I think CDA 230 applies in some cases. There was another lawsuit in Pennsylvania that involved a retractable dog leash where they used a CDA 230 defense because what was its stake had to do with how the dog leash was described in the listing I was on.
“Look, we’re just the platform where that information is listed. We didn’t edit it, so we’re not responsible for it in any way.” Which feels really strange, right? Because Amazon does tons and tons and tons of things to try to get us to buy different—they’re doing all sorts of rating mechanisms. They’re shipping these things in boxes that say Amazon on the side of them. This idea that we’re just the platform, we can’t sign off on this seems really peculiar. And of course, Gartner, when he tries to take the seller to court, ends up chasing after someone with an address in China who hasn’t responded to any subpoenas.
Ethan Zuckerman:
So you end up doing this really deep dive. A lot of this work is in a really thorough, thoughtful report that you write with data and society called “Amazon’s Trickle Down Monopoly.” One of the things that I really love about this report is that you start introducing language for talking about how different people are selling on Amazon. So, Hushijia, he or she is probably what we would call a global seller. This is someone in China who is looking at what’s selling in the United States, sourcing it from Shenzhen or anywhere else in the vast manufacturing economy and sort of selling it through Amazon. Maybe the most fascinating of these categories are what you call the arbitrage sellers. Explain to me how it makes sense for anyone involved that someone would spend their day buying things at Target and selling them at Amazon. I’m not sure there’s any story that has made me sadder about late stage capitalism than this story.
Moira Weigel:
Wow, I don’t know whether to say thank you or I’m sorry. Yeah, so in this research I did and published part of in a report for data and society. I try to lay out sort of different business models and kinds of Amazon seller that there are and there’s both a kind of chronology and typology to it. I’d say where certain business models are more popular or feasible at particular moments and then Amazon will make some policy shift and it’s not feasible anymore but a long tail of it persists to the present.
And anyway, one of these which also deeply fascinated me when I first heard about it is what folks in the community call arbitrage or retail arbitrage and what that refers to, it’s a term that an Amazon sort of influencer by the name of Chris Green takes credit for coining calling this reselling practice arbitrage. But what it refers to is trying to source goods somewhere, you know, somewhere else and sell them for more money on Amazon. It was very, very popular in the early 2010s for reasons I could get into.
But as I describe in the report, I met people and spent time with people who spend their days kind of gleaning consumer products from different locations, whether it’s a struggling big box store like Target near where they live, or sneaker wholesalers who they somehow have developed relationships with around the Boston area, enlisting them for more on Amazon. There was a funny way, I really got obsessed with this category for a phase of the research because there’s a funny way in which I think arbitrage is kind of the best figure for what the whole thing is, like Amazon’s the king arbitrager, and everyone else is just hustling to try to flip things and make their tiny piece as long as they can. But yeah, arbitrage refers to sourcing goods most classically by literally going to Target or going to Best Buy and combing over everything you can find to see what might be selling for more on Amazon. In 2014, Amazon actually released a feature in their seller app that encourages this, that’s a barcode scanner so sellers could go through stores and scan everything there and see what the current price was on Amazon. And indeed, there’s now another service, I think it’s called KEPA, that sellers often pay for that will give you historical price data because what Amazon gives you through the seller app is not as useful. It’ll tell you what that cup or that sneaker is selling for right now, but maybe it was different yesterday.
So I might choose to buy 20 bottles of Tide detergent, even though I can arbitrage them right now on Amazon and make money. Maybe historically it’s a really good arbitrage situation. I might start filling my garage with it. And folks may remember, and I actually got to know friends of this guy. Folks may remember at the very beginning of COVID, there was a New York Times story about these brothers who had bought, I think it was 17,000 bottles of hand sanitizer to try to arbitrage them on Amazon and were later charged with price gouging. And I think we’re sort of, you know, the most reviled people on the Internet for that one day that the New York Times story came out.
And on the one hand, I think their behavior was pretty antisocial. You know, it is bad behavior at the beginning of a global pandemic to go hoard hand sanitizer and try to gouge people for it. On the other hand, it was precisely what Amazon had been incentivizing and encouraging people to do for years. It was a very well-known business model in the community. And so to me, that was one of these moments of the pathology of the system sort of showing itself in a more public light.
Ethan Zuckerman:
And you make the argument that for Amazon to become the everything store, which it really has been, it couldn’t do it by itself. That it turned out that these third-party partners, whether they’re arbitrageurs, whether these global sellers, whether they’re small brands whose storefront might only be on Amazon. They might not do their own website. They might exist purely as a brand that ends up being sourced and fulfilled through Amazon. Why is it so helpful to Amazon to have this army, this quite vast army of third-party sellers out there?
Moira Weigel:
It’s a great question. I should say I think these figures are always fuzzy, but I believe the best current estimates are that there are about 6 million active third-party sellers and nearly 4,000 new seller accounts open every day. So it is really a very large number of people. If you’re Amazon, it’s the late 1990s, you’re wanting to expand and become the everything store. The question is how do you do that without assuming the risk, which is financial risk, involves labor and then also various kinds of liability or legal risk, as we were talking about, of going out and acquiring all those products and holding them in your warehouses and selling them as best you can, but maybe being stuck with a million Tamagotchi’s, or I don’t know what it would have been in the late 1990s after Christmas. And this third-party seller model is a way to induce or incentivize third parties, those 6 million and counting other people, not only to take on that work of stocking the catalog, but to pay for the privilege of doing the work of stocking that catalog. As Amazon develops new services for its customers, often it’s the third parties who sort of subsidize the build out of that infrastructure, right? Because they pay. They pay to use it. And we’ve seen that with Amazon’s growing ad business over the past five, 10 years dramatically. There’s a new study since I published my report that shows that the average third party Amazon seller pays, I think, about 55% of each sale to Amazon, which is up from 34% had been sort of the number before this study from, I think, 2019, the Institute for Local Software Alliance did a study and they found that it was 34. And then in the early 2010s, I believe it was about 19%. So it just goes up and up and up.
And in a sense, yeah, the third party is not only do all the work and bear all the risk, but also effectively subsidize Amazon’s push for global infrastructure domination.
Ethan Zuckerman:
Let’s unpack that for a moment, because that’s a mind blowing number. Is that 55% a profit or 55%?
Moira Weigel:
No, no, 55% of every sale. So whatever your weights cost.
Ethan Zuckerman:
So I know what my weights cost. You try to buy weights for about a dollar per pound and I ended up paying, yeah, I think I paid probably about $120 for 90 pounds of weights. And so you’re going to tell me that $65 of those dollars went to Amazon and $55 went to whoever most likely from China is manufacturing those weights and shipping them over on a container ship and getting them delivered to Amazon.
Moira Weigel:
Yeah, I should say most likely if they’re selling from China, and this was actually a fascinating part of my research for me as someone who had lived in China in the past and had some China Studies background, if your weights manufacturer most likely is in Guangdong province or Zhejiang province in China, most likely what they’re doing is making the weights and sending them to an Amazon receiving center just over the border, although not necessarily over the physical border, in a customs-free or duty-free zone.
And really, to me, a very fascinating part of the rise of Amazon in the 2010s is how dependent it is actually on the growth of Chinese entrepreneurship and on partnerships with the Chinese state. But Amazon along with Alibaba advise Xi Jinping’s government—it actually probably has more to do with Premier Li Keqiang than Xi Jinping—but advise the Chinese government on developing these duty-free warehouses so that effectively a Chinese merchant can ship something to FBA to fulfillment by Amazon and then Amazon is sort of the portal whereby that good reaches the United States and reaches you. So probably the 55% captures the container ship, part of it if they’re shipping with Amazon, but otherwise yes.
And I want to say, I don’t know if this quite fits here, but one of my big misconceptions when I started this research was that I would be finding people with preexisting businesses who just brought those businesses, quote unquote, online by putting them on Amazon and literally with maybe one or two exceptions out of 45 people I interviewed or so.
Every single person I talked to, it was an Amazon native business and they were businesses. And I heard again and again that businesses really had to be optimized for Amazon and its specific requirements in order to survive. And sometimes people would sell 10 or maybe even 15%, although that is rare of their goods through other platforms, but it really was an ecosystem of Amazon native businesses.
So it’s interesting them an opportunity question of whether, because like I said, Amazon would say they’re not being sold to at all. And that’s sort of their innovation over Walmart. But it’s certainly the case that for now, and maybe this will change with Xi’an and Temu and these other entrants into the e-commerce marketplace.
But for now, it seems that Amazon is so dominant in online commerce that for the most part if one wants to build a certain scale of business, that’s where it is. And I talked to person after person who said, “I really would like to diversify.” And I’ve tried and we have a Shopify storefront and we sell a bit through Home Depot and Walmart third party, but no matter how hard we try, 95% of it is Amazon
Ethan Zuckerman:
Let me ask about another concern that people have raised about Amazon—this is sort of Senator Elizabeth Warren’s concern—which is that Amazon in many ways feels like a deeply unfair marketplace. So if I’m selling weights, we’re going to stick to our example. I’m selling Olympic plate free weights on Amazon. Amazon can see what users seem to be looking for. Amazon can see that people like the rubber bumper plates better than the iron plates, and that there’s a particular price point that they sort of sell at. And at some point, we’ll probably see an Amazon basics version of this.
My understanding is that that is now a product made by Amazon. Although I’m saying that with great uncertainty because I suspect you probably looked into this, but Amazon is somehow mining the data of all its third party sellers and then creating a product as a first party to try to out-compete the people who it’s already taking 55% of the revenues from. Why would anyone sell on this platform under these circumstances?
Moira Weigel:
What you’ve just described, which I think is a familiar, given our sort of antitrust discourse of the past few years, is a familiar, relatively familiar kind of example of Amazon’s bad behavior. It just seems so egregiously anti-competitive that you wonder why they don’t just sit back and take their 55% of everything not do that particular thing but it must be that they make even more than 55% in that case.
When I first started this research I thought I would hear a lot of stories about that because it’s been a relatively big topic in the media, things getting knocked off or copied by Amazon Basics.
And I was surprised to discover, I think again of about 40 or 50 interviews, I can only think of one person who independently brought up that possibility. And he said, you know, you can always get dragon boated. And I said, what’s dragon boated? And he said, oh, you know, when Amazon just goes to your manufacturer and then hires them to make something very similar for them for the next three years.
So you go back and say, I want to place an order for more weights. And they say, sorry, someone bigger has already placed an order for very similar weights, for the next three years. But for the most part, when I asked sellers about that possibility, they basically took it for granted that that could always happen. And it wasn’t that they didn’t worry about it, but a phrase I heard more than once was, “Well, it’s their sandbox. You’re playing in their sandbox. That can always happen.” And what I heard a lot more about from them, and one question that’s become a source of special fascination to me, were things were various kinds of harms that looked more like platform governance issues or sort of algorithmic governance issues.
So for instance, unfair suspensions or failures to prevent abusive behavior by competitors and so on. And I could go through a litany of umpteen ludicrous examples of this kind of thing that I encountered. But I think people nonetheless come back to the platform because it does have such dominance and over US e-commerce, and not everyone does. I think increasingly some people interested in getting into e-commerce are trying to sell directly through TikTok or through Instagram or through Shopify. And so there are some alternatives, but I think Amazon’s marketplace is just so large.
And another thing I sometimes heard is that people would try Amazon thinking it was just one channel or that they could use it to grow in a certain way and then find themselves sort of totally locked into it. So I think it is just that its size makes it sort of inescapable for many of these sellers.
Ethan Zuckerman:
And to be clear, it is providing a real service. It is helping sellers find customers. It is providing warehousing. It is providing logistics. It sounds like in the case of my weights, it may have literally brought those weights over on a ship from China and put them into the warehouse so that they could be deployed to me.
Moira Weigel:
And this, if I can say, is because I didn’t, I realized I didn’t answer part of a question you asked earlier. I ended up calling my data and society report “Trickle Down Monopoly.” And part of what is really interesting to me about the third party seller story, although it can make them hard to write about in morally clear ways, is the really ambivalence of their position. You know, I think they’re often exploited and hurt by Amazon in different ways, but also like anyone hustling any system, they have a real stake in upholding the hustle for as long as it can work for them. And so, yeah, I think these people, I don’t know, they’re not, they certainly don’t see themselves as victims. You know, they’re not, I don’t know how to put it quite, but the reason I call it the trickle down monopoly is that people enter this marketplace hoping at least that they they can get their little piece of Amazon’s dominance. And sometimes they really can. Sometimes at least for some time before the game runs out.
Ethan Zuckerman:
Does Amazon blow itself up at some point? It is in this work that you’ve done within this, do you see the seeds of this model coming apart, whether it’s through an Elizabeth Warren or whether it’s through a third party sell a revolt? Or do you find yourself sort of looking at this and saying, no, this is how the world works now. And, you know, whoever does this better more viciously will be whoever is Amazon’s successor.
Moira Weigel:
It’s a great question. I mean, you know, I can’t predict the future. I don’t think its dominance is inevitable or necessarily permanent. I think I alluded earlier to Temu, the Chinese shopping app, and Shein is now the most downloaded shopping app in the United States and I think the possibility that a competitor that is not necessarily preferable by any means could displace Amazon in the future.
I think also, I mean, consumer trust and loyalty to Amazon is so high that I think certain things would have to get a lot worse for consumers to leave the company en masse.
But there have, you know, anecdotally, since I work on this, you know, people on airplanes or like my uncle will tell me about their bad Amazon shopping experiences. I think there was just a New York magazine article about this by the reporter John Herman. But it’s not as if consumers haven’t noticed this influx of random brands called things like AHXM3 to game the search algorithm results in many cases, hawking sort of low quality goods, whether that hurts them much in the long run is an open question, I think.
Ethan Zuckerman:
Cory Doctorow has a lovely description for this that he calls “enshitification. And his feeling is basically that any platform will essentially seek to exploit people in increasingly abusive ways. And as it gains more monopoly or monopsony power, its incentives are to go further and further. and going from 20 odd percent to 30 something to 55 percent, and opening up Amazon to goods that just aren’t any good that have five star ratings, which are completely artificially bought. I find myself capable of imagining a moment at which Amazon collapses under its own enshitification.
I just can’t decide if that’s a good thing or a bad thing because I’m not sure that buying directly from Chinese sellers on Chinese apps is going to be any happier. It seems like our ability to at least name and shame as difficult as it is with Amazon might be even harder in that case.
Moira Weigel:
Yeah, that’s a good point. I mean, I think the developments that seem most cautiously promising to me, although So again, I say that with a heavy note of caution are not necessarily the direct Chinese platform competition, nor my friend’s annoyance with the shoelaces that don’t work from brand HXQM2. I had to ask this friend, I was like, “What do you mean the shoelaces don’t work?” And he said they won’t stay tied. Then he bought on Amazon recently. But anyway, perhaps a little bit more promising than end-shitification leading to consumer flight or the sort of Sheehan model, displacing Amazon in the US marketplace, are these smaller alternatives?
And I did encounter in my research, and one thing I’m looking at going forward in research I haven’t published yet, are these cooperatives of sellers that have formed in some places, trying mostly, at least in the two or three instances I’m thinking of, initially these seller cooperatives formed just to try to get a bit more bargaining power with Amazon, thinking, okay, if there are 50 of us, maybe we can get a sales rep to answer our phone call and we can’t figure out why we’ve been suspended for a week. But I think the possibility of these groups pulling together and finding perhaps alternative kinds of logistic solutions or ways to reach people, maybe there’s some hope there.
Of course, my pie in the sky dream is I’m like, what if these cooperatives were to join in solidarity with the unionizing FC workers and work out some better terms? I think the reality of most of the politics of these small business people is that it’s a bit of a, it’ll be a bit of a long walk to get on board with labor, labor politics or a bit of a stretch. But I think, you know, not to be too grandiose, we also just need to rethink whether we want to live in a society where getting things as many things as possible, as cheaply as possible in one to two days is a, is a KPI or a goal, you know, I think there may not be ways to do that that aren’t shitty and in-shittifying?
Ethan Zuckerman:
Well, on that encouraging note, de-shittifying note, something along those lines.
Moira Weigel:
De-shittification.
Ethan Zuckerman:
Let me just sort of say, you know, Moira, you’re really sort of inexhaustible. You’ve got this new book, Voices from the Valley. Tech workers talk about what they do and how they do it. I’m excited to learn more about that, possibly to have you and Ben on to talk about this. This work on Amazon comes up in this wonderful report for Data and Society, an excellent piece in the New York Times. Moira Weigel, what a pleasure. It was great to have you here today.
Moira Weigel:
Thanks so much for having me.